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Abstract  
This article explores the gendered dimensions of the populist radical right discourse and 
policy by considering the Front national in France. The article shows how the Front national 
has progressively moved from a ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern traditional’ approach to issues of 
gender, women’s work, and the family. The core of the Front national policy and ideology 
has remained stable over time, with regard to the interconnected issues of gender and of 
immigration. However, there is a significant move from the celebration of women as ‘mothers 
of the nation’, prevalent in the party until the 1990s, to an emphasis on ‘working mothers’ in 
Marine Le Pen’s discourse. The article also analyses the ambivalence of Marine Le Pen’s 
party discourse on gender, as well as the discrepancies between the party discourse and its 
political programme. This ambivalence mirrors the internal conflicts between the leadership 
and the conservative Catholic faction. This evolution of the Front national discourse on 
gender is linked to the party history and internal politics as well as to broader long-term social 
changes in French society.  
 
The French populist radical right party1 (henceforth PRR), the Front national (henceforth 
FN), is undergoing a major transition, as shown by intense media visibility and growing 
scholarly literature2. Marine Le Pen, who took over from her father Jean-Marie Le Pen as FN 
president in 2011, has engaged in an enterprise of ‘modernisation’ and ‘de-demonisation’ 
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(dédiabolisation) of its public image, with the acknowledged objective of enlarging its 
electoral support and transforming the FN into a large mainstream party capable of achieving 
political office. In striking contrast to the anti-egalitarian political culture of the French far 
right, the FN has appropriated the issue of secularism and republican values, which are 
traditionally employed by the left wing and which constitute a powerful resource for 
legitimacy in French politics. The FN anti-immigration agenda has been reformulated to 
focus on the defence of republican secularism, the necessity of a ‘French Islam’ and of a 
policy of assimilation into the Republic. Le Pen has distanced herself from her father’s 
controversial declarations on WW2 and colonialism, and Jean-Marie Le Pen was expelled 
from the party in 2015. Under its new leader, the FN has also moderated its (once highly 
conservative) positions on issues of gender, sexuality and the family. Through this new 
discourse, the leadership aims at securing the support of categories of voters who are 
traditionally less represented in the FN electorate, such as women and young people as well 
as the ethnic minorities. In particular, women voters are the last obstacle on the road to power 
for the party, as they count for more than half of the electorate. In the 2014 municipal 
elections, the FN consolidated its position as the third party in France. In the European 
elections of the same year, it was the most voted-for political formation, before the 
conservative right. In the first round of 2017 presidential elections too, the FN was the second 
most voted for party but was overwhelmingly defeated in the run-off round. In the legislative 
elections of the same year, the results were very deceiving for its leader: the FN secured 13.2 
per cent of the votes, dropping below its 2012 performance. Thus, under Marine Le Pen, the 
FN has achieved significant electoral successes, although it remains an ‘outsider party’ 
incapable of establishing alliances with mainstream parties. 
Yet as various scholars have noted, today more than ever the challenge for the FN is to 
manage the tension between its anti-establishment extremism and the ambition to gain 
democratic credibility and secure institutional positions3. Stigmatisation, linked to its ‘anti-
immigration’ positions as well as its anti-democratic and misogynist image, constitutes the 
core of its politics, providing a powerful resource for rallying activists and voters; at the same 
time, the radicalisation of its agenda can lead to electoral decrease. This article analyses the 
gendered dimension of this enterprise of ‘modernisation’ of the FN by exploring the tension - 
which has long characterised the FN discourse and policy on immigration - between the 
search for democratic respectability and the maintenance of radical positions. It does so 
through a comparison, based on documentary data4, between the FN discourse and policy on 
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gender issues under Jean-Marie Le Pen, and under Marine Le Pen. The significance of the FN 
in European populist politics, and its long history, make it a significant case for examining 
the PRR gendered strategies and the evolution of PRR discourse on gender over time. 
Founded in 1972, the FN is one of the oldest and most successful political forces in this party 
family; as such, it has been largely studied and taken as a model by other such parties. 
The article begins with an introductory section discussing existing studies of gender and 
the PRR. The second section takes stock of the scholarly literature focusing on gender and the 
FN ideology as well as on women’s participation in the party under the former leader Jean-
Marie Le Pen. The article then moves on to analyse how, under its current leader, ideas of 
gender are played out in the party discourse in order to correct its traditionally misogynist 
image. This section also presents the FN’s current ideology and policy on gender, sexuality, 
and the family as well as women’s current involvement in the party. The conclusion presents 
the key research findings. 
 
Gender and women in the European PRR 
Women are largely underrepresented as voters, members and elected representatives in 
European PRR parties5, which tend to champion the family as the fundamental basis of the 
social order. An established body of feminist scholarship has shown that essentialist views of 
gender and cultural difference are central to the ideology of nationalist and rightist 
movements and organisations across the world - including the European PRR6. More 
specifically, the naturalisation of the public/private divide is closely interconnected with 
processes of racialisation: anti-immigration and nationalist discourses are highly gendered, 
creating gender-specific roles for men (caring fathers, protectors of the nation’s mothers, 
brothers in arms) and women (caring mothers of the nation) in the national community7. 
Feminist studies of nationalism have shown that women are mobilised as biological as well as 
cultural reproducers of the national community, being assigned the role of embodying the 
national honour and the integrity of the nation’s boundaries8. Thus the naturalisation of 
gender and of national belonging are intertwined discourses in the European PRR, which 
explains its overarching family-centred imagination.  
Nonetheless, there is significant variation in the positions of different PRR parties on 
issues of gender, the family, and sexuality. Scholars have questioned the view of these parties 
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as monolithically sexist, pointing that there is an overstatement of sexism as a specificity of 
the PRR. Cas Mudde9 suggests that the same positions on gender and the family may 
characterise both the PRR and the mainstream right; he also reminds us that, in terms of 
women’s underrepresentation as members, voters and representatives, PRR parties are similar 
to right-wing parties. Others call for further research to compare the PRR with the 
mainstream right, to investigate similarities and differences with regard to their gender 
conservatism and women’s participation10. Further, European PRR parties’ views on gender 
are diverse, ranging from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern traditional’ positions11. Parties holding 
‘traditional’ views on gender hold women exclusively as mothers, claiming that they should 
return to the home to fill their ‘natural’ role; parties holding ‘modern traditional’ positions on 
gender tolerate women’s work, while considering women as primarily responsible for social 
reproductive work. Regional differences have also been noted, as overall the Northern 
European PRR is more clearly shifting towards ‘modern traditional’ positions on gender than 
PRR parties in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe12. For example, the Dutch Party for 
Freedom and the Danish People’s Party do not regard abortion as a major concern and do not 
emphasise the role of women as ‘mothers of the nation’13. Instead, in Germany, Alternative 
For Germany celebrates the hetero-normative family composed by a male breadwinner and 
an housewife, and has been active in so-called mobilisations against gender equality policies 
and against gay and reproductive rights14. In Italy, the Northern league holds a pragmatic 
position on women’s work and occasionally displays ambivalence on homosexuality; albeit 
with erratic developments, traditional family issues hold decreasing significance in the 
Northern league party discourse15. All this conflicts with the strong family policy of the PRR 
in Central and Eastern Europe, which emphasises the need for defending traditional family 
roles from the so-called ‘gender ideology’ imported by the European Union political élites16. 
PRR positions on gender vary not only in different national contexts but also over time: it 
seems that in the West European PRR, gender-wise conservative positions and discourses on 
the family have become less salient than in the past17. 
One major development in the gendered discourse of the PRR in recent years has been 
the ‘racialisation of sexism’18. While overall the emphasis on the traditional family and the 
gendered division of work seems to have decreased in the West European PRR party family, 
issues of gender and sexuality have become more salient when it comes to debating 
immigration, integration and multiculturalism19. In this discourse, gender equality is posited 
as a positive achievement of so-called Western civilisation which should be defended from 
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the threat constituted by the migrants’ culture, which is portrayed as patriarchal. The national 
community is described as a place where gender equality has been achieved while ‘pre-
modern’ models of gender are ascribed to the racialised Other –migrants, and, more 
specifically, those coming from Muslim countries. However, this new emphasis on gender 
equality only applies to the context of multiculturalism and immigration. For example, in the 
Swedish Democrats party, a double-gendered discourse is used which relates to two forms of 
cultural reproduction of the nation: inter-generational and boundary-producing20. In terms of 
the inter-generational reproduction, in the matter of work/family balance, care work, and 
women’s work, the party naturalises gender differences; conversely, when creating 
boundaries with the non-Swedish Other (such as in the matter of the Islamic headscarf, 
genital mutilation, and ‘honour killings’), the party relies on the instrumental mobilisation of 
gender equality. While presenting themselves as defenders of gender equality, against the 
threat of Muslim immigration, PRR parties - including those that hold ‘modern traditional’ 
positions on gender - still consider the gendered division of work and related issues (pay gap, 
division of unpaid care and domestic work in the family, reconciliation of domestic 
responsibilities and work, and positive discrimination) as ‘natural’ individual choices that 
politics should not tamper with21.  
 
Gender and the FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen  
Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN held highly conservative positions on gender, 
sexuality, and the family. This is expressed in the positions of the conservative Catholic 
fraction led by Bernard Antony, who was a prominent member of the party under Le Pen 
father. However, the FN has always maintained a complex relationship to the Catholic world 
and never supported a Catholic agenda, mobilising instead Catholicism as a symbol of the 
French nation, based on a neo-Maurassianist approach. While mainstream Catholic 
churchgoers have traditionally been marginal among the FN voters, due in large part to the 
critical approach of the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the FN anti-immigration agenda, 
conservative Catholics have long been represented in the party under Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
alongside and in conflict with the secular neo-pagan strand of the French extreme right22.  
According to the party’s gendered ideology under its former leader, nature and religion 
are the foundations of the social order23. In the FN rhetoric, essentialist representations of the 
family and the nation were closely intertwined. In 1996, Jean-Marie Le Pen declared that 
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women do not have the ‘property of their person’ and do not hold control over their own 
bodies, as these belong to the ‘Nation’ and to ‘Nature’24. He also defined homosexuality as a 
‘biological and social anomaly’25. Le Pen regularly used the domestic metaphor to legitimise 
the principle of the ‘national preference26’, likening the society to a family and contractual 
links to blood ties; the party too is represented as a cohesive group based on this domestic 
metaphor27. Le Pen’s discourse has been analysed as revolving around gendered and 
hierarchical dualisms based on nature that oppose Us (the inside, the private) to the racialised 
Other looming large on the outside28. 
These views were reflected by party policy. The political programmes of the FN were 
distinctive in that one could not find any entries for ‘women’ or ‘gender equality’, as is the 
case for the programmes of other French parties. Instead, women were referred to only in the 
sections concerning the family. In their review of the FN electoral programmes from its 
origins to 1997, Nonna Mayer and Mariette Sineau29 note that, in comparison with the pages 
devoted to the issue of immigration, those concerning family policy are quite limited. 
Women, nonetheless, are central to FN policy: the traditional family, and the status of women 
as mothers, are seen as key to the promotion of national demographics and to counter a 
multicultural society. The political programme for the 1984 European elections proposed a 
‘maternal salary’ and the abrogation of the Veil law granting the right to abortion30. The 1985 
programme explicitly referred to the Vichy regime legislation as a model for family policy 
and was critical of the public provision of childcare31. The connection between family-
oriented policies and immigration policies was expressed by the two principles of ‘family 
preference’ and of ‘national preference’, as formulated in the 1993 political programme. Over 
the years, the FN policy has advocated pro-natality measures benefiting families with many 
children and financial measures encouraging women to devote themselves full-time to 
motherhood and care/domestic work, such as the ‘maternal income’. Such family allowances 
and benefits were reserved for French (or European) citizens. Further recurrent measures 
have included the creation of an official status for non-working mothers and the familial vote 
(meaning that parents are entitled to vote as many times as they have children), as well as 
control of sex education in schools, and of pornography, with the objective of protecting the 
youth and defending morality. However, over the 1990s, the party came to somewhat amend 
these ‘traditional’ positions on gender, and in 1993 the ‘maternal income’ was renamed 
‘parental income’32. Nonetheless, in 2007, the FN programme still maintained a strong focus 
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on pro-natalist measures, focusing on financial support for large families, claiming that the 
French family is in crisis, calling for increasing the birth rate and condemning abortion33.  
The participation of women in the FN under its former leader reflected these ‘traditional’ 
views of gender. In line with the ideology of the party, the division of tasks and 
responsibilities between female and male activists and elected officials tended to assign 
women to the political work connected with social issues such as education and the family, 
viewed as typically carried out by women. The activity of the now-defunct FN women’s sub-
organisation National Circle of European Women (CNFE, Cercle National des femmes 
d’Europe), founded in 1985, is exemplary of the ‘traditional’ view of gender which marked 
the former leadership. Many CNFE members, belonging to the Catholic fraction, quit the 
party in overt criticism of Marine Le Pen’s pragmatic positions on abortion and 
homosexuality: this feminine organisation no longer exists. Its official objective was to 
defend the ‘French family’, considered as the central unit of the so-called ‘natural’ social 
order. Martine Lehideux, who has been vice-president of the FN and a leading member of 
CNFE, stated that the family is the ‘keystone of the natural order (…), the vital cell of our 
society’34. The CNFE core activities concerned anti-abortion and pro-natality campaigning, 
involvement in charitable work, the defence of morality against pornography and 
homosexuality, and the protection of youth, supposedly threatened by drugs and Marxism. 
Catholic female members of the FN were also involved in the pro-life associations close to 
the party35.  
However, reflecting the evolving positions of the party on gender, and to accommodate 
the experiences of younger generations of French women, the CNFE came to recognise that 
women may find fulfilment in paid work. In the 1990s, the organisation advocated ‘parental 
income’ or ‘family income’ and declared that its objective was to help women to ‘choose’ 
between work and family, and to reconcile domestic responsibilities with employment36. 
Qualitative studies of women’s participation in the party, carried out in the 1990s, shed light 
on the tension between the FN’s overtly sexist ideology and the aspirations of working 
women and single women without children who were party members. These studies 
distinguish between different generations of female activists involved in the CNFE and in the 
party youth organisation, the FNJ (Front National de la Jeunesse). On the one hand, they 
suggest that women were attracted to the party by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s hyper-masculine 
figure and that their main concern and motivation for joining the party was the defence of the 
traditional family37. On the other, some FN female members contradicted the traditional 
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models of gender promoted by the party in their own lives38. For instance, while refusing the 
label ‘feminist’, younger female activists were critical of some of the party’s positions (such 
as those on homosexuality and abortion), and they saw maternity as a choice rather than as a 
destiny39.  
Based on a review of existing studies, this section has discussed the gendered dimension 
of the FN ideology, policy and membership, indicating that, under its former leader, the party 
was a highly ‘masculinised’ PRR political organisation: it expressed overtly sexist views and 
supported highly conservative (‘traditional’) policies in the matter of gender - even if its 
positions softened over the years. The article will now consider how, under its new leader, the 
FN has come to present its propositions in a more ‘modern’ manner, particularly on the issue 
of women’s work, and has further modified its policy on gender and the family.  
 
The FN under Marine Le Pen: a ‘masculine’ party in transition 
The strategy of ‘modernisation’ of the FN under Marine le Pen has been supported by the 
novelty of having a woman as leader of the party: dominant assumptions about women as 
naturally caring and less violent than men have softened the perception of a party which has 
traditionally been stigmatised for the sulphurous statements of its former leader on 
colonialism and WW2, and for its aggressive anti-immigration rhetoric. More specifically, 
the ‘modernisation’ of the FN discourse under Marine Le Pen involves mobilising ideas of 
gender and addressing the issue of working women to appeal to female voters, thus creating 
distance from the overtly sexist declarations of her father.  
To begin with, Marine Le Pen aims at conveying a modern image of herself as a working 
woman. She is a professional and twice-divorced mother who lives unmarried with her 
current partner. In her autobiography she stresses her experience as a working mother and 
describes herself as ‘almost a feminist’, recalling the period when, after her divorce, she 
struggled to combine her job and political role with caring for her three children40. Several 
pages of the autobiography are devoted to commenting on the hardship suffered by working 
mothers and on the ‘double burden’ of work and family responsibilities to which women are 
subject. In addition, the FN aims at associating itself with gender equality and ‘sexual 
modernity41’ while discrediting its political opponents. Sexism is attributed to the enemies of 
the FN as gender equality appears as an important resource which is used by the party to 
establish its legitimacy in the political arena. For instance, Le Pen stated that the FN is the 
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least sexist party in France42. In her autobiography, she refers to male politicians of the 
French Socialist Party as old machos (‘éléphants machos du PS’)43. She also says that women 
are one of the social groups which the left wing has betrayed by giving up the struggle of 
gender equality: she speaks about the value of the ‘defence of women’ (rather than women’s 
rights). She continues by declaring to be enraged by the falsehood of those who describe the 
FN as a party that would like to send the women back to the kitchen. The racialised Other is 
attacked on the same ground: referring to the suburbs inhabited by working class racialised 
French and migrants (banlieues), Marine Le Pen said: ‘In some neighbourhoods it is not 
convenient to be a woman, gay, Jew, or even French or white44’.                                           
Furthermore, Marine Le Pen has repeatedly claimed to stand by working mothers, who 
are primarily affected by economic globalisation and neoliberal policies. She declared that 
today women are the first victims of the economic crisis and that female workers are used as 
an adjustment variable; she also insists that she knows how these women workers feel 
because of her own experience as a working mother45. In this respect, gender is relevant to 
the anti-liberal and anti-capitalist tone of the FN current discourse. This partly diverges from 
the neoliberal claims initially made by Jean-Marie Le Pen before the FN ‘social turn’ of the 
1990s46. Marine Le Pen systematically accords a central role to the (exclusionary) welfare 
state, appealing to working-class voters who tend to be in favour of redistributive policies47. 
The FN traditionally receives votes from all social classes, but there is evidence that Marine 
Le Pen has attracted growing support from manual workers, the traditional stronghold of the 
left48. The FN presented itself as defender of the hard-working and tax-paying ‘forgotten of 
France’ (la France des oubliés), protecting the members of the national community from the 
attacks perpetrated by the ‘double enemy’ of the people: the migrants and the political 
élites49. It should be noted however that during the course of the 2012 campaign the new 
prominence of economic issues progressively diminished to the advantage of the traditional 
issues of immigration and ‘law and order’50.   
This focus on issues such as social protection and the expansion of public services 
against economic globalisation can be particularly appealing for women. PRR studies argue 
that women are traditionally underrepresented among the voters of these parties because, 
compared with men, they benefit more from welfare state services and are more often 
employed in public sector jobs: they are thus more likely to be affected by and more adverse 
to the neoliberal policies traditionally supported by PRR parties51. Working-class men instead 
would be more likely to vote for PRR parties because, compared with women, they are 
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overrepresented in industrial jobs threatened by economic globalisation and migrant labour52. 
The 2012 presidential elections saw the narrowing of the traditional ‘gender gap’53 between 
the number of men and women voting for the FN to 2%: Nonna Mayer54 has advanced some 
possible explanations for this growth of women’s votes based on the economic recession, 
which has negatively affected employment in feminised precarious service sector jobs. Just 
like men in industrial jobs hit by the recession, women, too, can perceive themselves as 
economically disadvantaged by globalisation. Furthermore, the appeal of Le Pen’s ‘modern’ 
femininity may have attracted younger female voters. In the past, cultural explanations have 
been applied to account for the ‘gender gap’ in PRR support: it was argued that women voted 
less for Jean-Marie Le Pen’s party because they were attached to their established rights 
(such as access to paid work)55. Today, however, according to polls, Le Pen’s female voters 
have a more positive image of their chosen candidate than the men who voted for her at the 
2012 presidential elections: 74% of female voters versus 56% of the male voters declared that 
they would like to see her elected56. Other recent survey-based studies show that the 
feminisation of the FN vote is not simply associated with recent ideological or leadership 
changes in the party, or with the current economic crisis; rather, it is an on-going process 
which has progressed from the 1990s onwards57. Finally, while the recent erosion of the 
‘gender gap’ in PRR vote in France is a remarkable exception, in other respects the FN has 
merely amplified its past electoral trends: it still obtains its best results among less-educated 
voters and relies on growing support from the working class. The attitudes of Marine Le 
Pen’s voters, dominated by ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, are very similar to those of 
the voters who supported her father58. 
The ‘modernisation’ of the FN discourse on gender is accompanied by some changes in 
the party political programmes. Under Marine Le Pen, the FN has softened its positions on 
the family, sexuality, and women’s work, moving towards a more progressive agenda which 
is likely to appeal to the younger generation. The 2012 political programme expresses 
tolerance of same-sex civil partnerships but is against same-sex marriage and the adoption of 
children by gay couples. Le Pen has tended to abstain from intervening in recent debates on 
same-sex marriage and has not taken part in the mobilisations against the law which has 
made this possible in 2013: unlike immigration and security, issues of the family and 
sexuality are not the most profitable in electoral terms from the point of view of the FN 
leadership. Le Pen has a similarly pragmatic position on abortion. Instead of proposing the 
abrogation of the Veil law, as her father did, the FN proposes that abortion no longer be paid 
11 
 
for by the national health system59. The 2017 presidential programme states that a national 
plan for equal pay for men and women will be implemented: interestingly, this is included in 
the section on ‘Rebuilding France as a country of freedom’60. 
These tolerant positions on abortion, homosexuality, and women’s work, combined with 
Le Pen’s attempt to reframe FN politics to make it compatible with republican values, have 
produced discontent among conservative Catholics and ‘historical’ party members - including 
Bernard Antony and Martine Lehideux61. Today the FN is internally divided between two 
‘souls’ of the party62: the secularist neo-Gaullist line embodied by the leadership, on the one 
hand, and on the other, the liberal-conservative faction which has linkages with the 
conservative Catholic milieu. The latter is represented by some leading party members. 
Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, a member of the French parliament, holds same-sex marriage and 
abortion at the core of her agenda and has taken part in the demonstrations against gay 
marriage. Aymeric Chauprade, a member of the European Parliament, while commenting on 
the report on abortion and contraception presented by the Parliament gender equality 
commission, declared that this was ‘a mass destruction weapon against European 
demography63’. Dominique Martin, also a member of the European Parliament, declared that 
returning to the maternal role in the home would constitute true liberation for working 
women; in addition to liberating jobs for others in the context of massive unemployment, this 
would rescue the children of these women from drugs and other threats of which they are 
victims because they are left on their own by their working mothers64.  
These changes in the ideology and policy of the FN combine with new developments in 
terms of its membership. It appears that FN female members have increased in recent years65. 
Nonetheless, women’s participation in the FN as party members and elected representatives 
remains limited. According to the party’s official figures, there were 74,000 members in 2013 
of which 39% were women; scholars estimate that there were 42,130 party members in 
201466. Very few qualitative studies of FN activists have been conducted after the new leader 
took over from her father. My analysis of gender relations in PRR activism67 is unique in that 
I have systematically compared male and female members of FN: women join the FN for a 
variety of reasons which do not simply reflect their concerns as ‘mothers of the nation’ and 
are not only based on their attachment to traditional family values. Indeed, many newly 
recruited FN female activists are attracted to the party because they can identify with the 
‘modern’ femininity of Marine Le Pen: they claim that they did not approve of the sexist 
declarations and ‘macho’ style of the FN former leader. Conversely, some male FN members 
12 
 
use ‘modern’ gender models to explain their affiliation, to racialise migrants and construct 
their national and political belonging. For example, some men identify with anti-immigration 
mobilisations through ‘modern’ models of masculinity and fatherhood, describing migrants 
as ‘bad fathers’. The new generation of FN party members display a pragmatic attitude vis-à-
vis abortion, contraception and homosexuality.  
Yet these remarkable changes in the FN outlook and policy on gender, as well as the 
feminisation of the party membership, are accompanied by a systematic ambivalence, 
expressed in Le Pen’s ambiguous use of the argument of women’s freedom of choice. In her 
autobiography, after claiming that women are victims of the ‘double burden’ of domestic and 
professional work, she criticises those male politicians who call for women workers’ rights, 
raising the question whether women still have the choice of not working. Thus, rather than 
calling for the need for a more equitable gendered division of work, she suggests that women 
lack the freedom to choose not to work68. In the same pages, she states that the FN economic 
policy and its family policy, through ‘parental income’, would enable women to make a ‘real 
choice’ when it comes to working. She also declared that, for precarious female workers, real 
progress would be to return to the home69. She also claims that those politicians and feminists 
who advocate gender equality in employment are disconnected from the reality of French 
women’s lives and aspirations70. The same narrative is used with regard to abortion. Here the 
FN uses the arguments of anti-abortion movements, which have dismissed the ‘outdated’ 
religious repertoire to present themselves as the defenders of women’s rights, questioning 
whether women’s movements of the 1970s were truly ‘feminist’71. Le Pen writes that the 
problem is that many women today don’t have the choice not to get an abortion; for this she 
blames the feminist movement which, she claims, presented it ‘as the summit of freedom’ for 
women72. Thus while the FN no longer holds the anti-abortion struggle as a priority, it puts an 
emphasis on enabling women to be free to choose not to abort. The 2012 presidential 
programme states that women must have a ‘real choice’ that includes not getting an abortion, 
and aims at promoting campaigns of information and prevention as well as pre-natal 
adoption. In 2012 Louis Aliot, vice-president of the FN and partner of Marine Le Pen, echoed 
these ideas by criticising the use of abortion as a form of contraception73.  
The pragmatic positions of Le Pen on abortion and same-sex partnerships co-exist with a 
strong emphasis of the party programmes on pro-natalist policies, in line with the FN 
tradition. To begin with, in the 2012 presidential manifesto, women are referred to only in the 
sections concerning issues related to the family, in direct continuity with the previous 
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leadership. This programme advocates improving allowances for large families and a 
‘parental income’ which ensures the possibility of choosing freely between professional work 
and childrearing for both mothers and fathers. It also states that the family, intended as 
‘exclusively based on the union of a man and a woman with the view to welcoming children 
born from a father and a mother’, is a vital institution and the base of society74. The party also 
advocates supporting French women and men to combine work and family responsibilities. 
However not one reference to childcare services is made. Furthermore, the formally gender-
neutral approach to ‘parental salary’ in the programme conflicts with Le Pen’s declarations in 
the press, where she speaks about a ‘maternal salary’75. The 2012 programme also condemns 
the birth decline in France, alongside the traditional nationalist discourse: ‘out of 832,799 
children born in 2010, only 667,707 were the children of two French citizens’. In addition, 
the traditional association between defence of nation and defence of the family through pro-
natality measures persists in the FN today. The principle of the ‘national preference’, 
renamed ‘national priority’ or ‘citizens’ priority’, remains the guiding principle of the 2012 
presidential programme. This includes the traditional proposal of granting family allowances 
and the ‘parental income’ to only those families where at least one of the parents is French. 
Similarly, the 2017 presidential programme advocates pro-natalist measures for French 
families and states that the ‘national priority’ principle should be included in the French 
Constitution; furthermore, while the manifesto states that an national equal pay programme is 
needed, there is no information on how the party intends to set this up. In discontinuity with 
the previous presidential programme, however, the 2017 manifesto does not mention either 
abortion or the ‘parental salary’ and does not includes a section focusing specifically on the 
family: unlike in the past, the family does not seem to be singled-out as one field of 
intervention of the FN. 
This discussion shows that the FN has transformed its gendered discourse. It has done 
this by mobilising the figure of working women who embody a model of modern femininity: 
this then serves as a counterbalance to the representation of Muslim women as ‘pre-modern’ 
subaltern victims. Yet, despite this reference to working mothers and a pragmatic approach to 
abortion, a strong ambiguity characterises the leader’s approach. This can be seen in her use 
of the argument of women’s choice in relation to these matters. Also, despite a move towards 
a more liberal programme in the matter of the family and sexuality and, in the most recent 
elections, the conspicuous absence of issues of abortion and of the family as one specific field 
of intervention, the FN policy is characterised by a strong continuity: this materialises in the 
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significant pro-natality measures and in the connection between, on the one hand, the defence 
of the family and, on the other, the anti-immigration struggle, expressed by the principle of 
‘national priority’.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis has indicated that, over time, the FN has shifted from ‘traditional’ to 
‘modern-traditional’ discourses and policies on gender. Some liberalisation of the party 
positions on the family could already be observed in the 1990s, under Jean-Marie Le Pen. 
The partial liberalisation of the FN discourse and policy on gender under the former leader 
can be partly attributed to Marine Le Pen, who was involved in the direction of her father’s 
electoral campaigns. The new gendered discourse of the FN aims at accommodating the 
widespread expectations and practices of gender in contemporary France and at challenging 
the perception of the party as misogynist, by attributing sexism to its political opponents (and 
to the racialised Other). The new emphasis of the FN on issues of employment, social 
protection and the (exclusionary) welfare state combines with a focus on working 
women/mothers. This indicates a significant shift from a discourse celebrating traditional 
models of gender (embodied by the ‘mothers of the nation’) to a focus on ‘modern’ 
femininity (embodied by ‘working women/mothers’). These changes in the party discourse 
have been accompanied by a partial modification of its programmatic positions on issues of 
gender, sexuality and the family, towards a more pragmatic policy on abortion and same-sex 
civil unions. Indeed, the most recent 2017 FN political programme seems to indicate a 
decreasing emphasis on family and abortion issues compared with the previous Marine Le 
Pen’s electoral manifesto. 
This article has suggested, however, that the inclusion of new ideological elements, such 
as the mobilisation of the theme of gender equality and the emphasis on ‘working women’, 
does not invalidate the analyses associating the FN as well as other PRR parties’ discourse 
with the naturalisation of social relations of gender and ethnicity76. Essentialist views of 
gender and the ethno-pluralist defence of national identity remain crucially intertwined in the 
FN discourse. Despite adjustments and reformulations, the gendered core of the FN policy 
and ideology has remained stable, echoing studies of other PRR parties which simultaneously 
celebrate the gendered ‘difference in the family’ and ‘sameness in the nation’77. This emerges 
for instance from Marine Le Pen’s declarations decrying the declining French demographics. 
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Further, the new leader’s declarations advocating women’s ‘freedom of choice’ of not having 
an abortion and of not working obscure the structural and hierarchical dimension of gender 
relations in which women’s lives are inscribed. In the same vein, recent scholarship has 
examined the recent ‘republican turn’ in the FN ideology to conclude that the ‘second FN’78 
is in strong continuity with the FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen with regard to its nativist core. 
The FN ‘republican’ discourse on secularism has been considered merely as a lexical 
innovation which retains an exclusionary dimension to stigmatise migrants and Muslims 79. 
The ‘republicanisation’ of the FN ideology thus coexists with the traditional ethno-pluralism 
of the party ideology: secularism is presented by the FN as an inherently Christian value and 
as a feature par excellence of the French culture80. 
The article also pointed to the ambivalence of Marine Le Pen’s discourse on women’s 
work and abortion as well as to tensions between the leader’s discourse and the party 
programmes. Women’s work and abortion are accepted but at the same time those women 
who get an abortion are stigmatised, and feminists advocating equal rights for men and 
women workers are dismissed as elitist. Women are celebrated as working mothers, rather 
than as housewives; same-sex partnerships are tolerated (while the primacy of the ‘natural’ 
heterosexual family is not questioned); the right to abortion is also tolerated (albeit implicitly 
and powerfully challenged). The unequal gendered division of unpaid care and domestic 
work is never explicitly addressed as an issue by the FN party programmes; similarly, there 
are no policy proposals which aim at encouraging men to participate in a more equitable 
division of work, and there is no mention of childcare services. This suggests a strong 
association between women and the home, which combines with the acceptance of the 
inclusion of women into the labour market. Thus the party discourse maintains a certain 
essentialism but also loosens the ‘natural’ links between home and women, condoning 
women’s work. In this view, women must reconcile paid work and the family, while men are 
absent from this scenario and can, if they choose, devote themselves to unpaid care work. 
The ideological changes analysed in the article are inscribed in a view of society from which 
gendered social hierarchies are evacuated. 
This ambivalence also mirrors the different take – more or less conservative - of the 
secular and the Catholic ‘souls’ of the FN on issues of gender, which the leadership has to 
accommodate. In her attempts to negotiate this internal tension, Le Pen strategically moves 
from more pragmatic to more radical positions on gender in her discourse. The liberalisation 
of the FN views on gender has gained momentum since Marine Le Pen took over as president 
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of the party and started an enterprise of ‘modernisation’ of the party, making ‘secularism’ her 
trademark. The neo-pagan secular component and the nationalist Catholic faction have 
disappeared from the party under the new leadership, and the celebration of France as a 
Catholic nation has been replaced by a secularist approach. In 2004, together with other 
younger members of the party, Marine Le Pen pushed the conservative Catholic 
representatives to quit the party81. However, as discussed in the article, there remains a 
liberal-conservative faction hostile to the leader’s pragmatic approach to gender and morality 
issues, which benefits from significant visibility. This tension can ultimately be understood as 
an outcome of the long-standing broader tension existing between the strategy of ‘de-
demonisation’ on the one hand, and the leaders’ effort to maintain FN’s appeal to the most 
radical fringes and voters. This echoes existing analyses of the ‘tactical variations’ in the FN 
agenda on immigration, which has been amended, re-formulated, and subsequently re-
radicalised depending on phases of expansion or contraction of the electoral base82.  
Furthermore, such changes and tensions in the FN discourse on gender can be placed in 
the context of wider processes of secularisation, and linked to the recent appropriation, by the 
West European PRR, of religion and secularism issues. PRR parties increasingly mobilise the 
references to Christianity as a symbol of national belonging to attack the Muslims: 
Christianity is defined in terms of national identity and not as a set of normative social and 
moral values. The PRR claims to defend so-called Judeo-Christian civilisation against 
Muslim migrants, and associates it with liberal values such as secularism, religious freedom 
and women’s rights83. PRR parties are secular and have more liberal positions on the family 
and sexuality than the Catholic Church and hard-core Catholic believers; practicing Catholics 
are underrepresented among PRR voters. Marine Le Pen’s voters are younger and more 
secular than her father’s, and those of the French conservative right party84. Thus the move of 
the FN towards ‘modern traditional’ positions on gender is linked, in ways which have yet to 
be researched, with its changing approach towards religion and Catholic morals.  
Finally, in exploring the evolving positions and views on gender of the FN, the article 
responds to a call for further research investigating how the gendered appeals and positions of 
PRR parties vary across countries as well as over time: this could contribute to providing a 
more accurate conceptual definition of this party family, which systematically incorporates 
gender, a dimension which has been largely overlooked in PRR studies85. In this respect, the 
article contributes to the recent scholarship on gender and the PRR, challenging dominant 
views of this party as monolithically sexist. The article provides new empirical evidence on 
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the most recent developments of the FN discourse and policy. In so doing it concurs with 
existing studies to indicate that traditional family issues have been downplayed by the FN 
since the late 1990s, even if, in the context of Western Europe, this party can be placed 
among the most conservative PRR parties on issues of gender86. In this respect, the FN 
follows the wider trend in the decreasing salience of gender issues which affect the West 
European PRR. As discussed, in the case of the FN, these ideological changes are largely 
instrumental but also linked to the party’s history and internal politics as well as to broader, 
long-term social changes in society. It remains to be seen whether the FN’s new outlook on 
gender will further evolve towards more liberal policy proposals and towards a lesser 
emphasis on family issues, or whether it will move back to more traditional positions on 
gender due to contingent political contexts and strategies.  
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